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CAN THE UNITED STATES TALK THE  
TALK & WALK THE WALK WHEN IT  
COMES TO LIBEL TOURISM: HOW THE 
FREEDOM TO SUE ABROAD CAN KILL  
THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AT HOME 
 
Tara Sturtevant 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a relatively new legal phenomenon with which legal 
scholars, practitioners, and law students alike are not generally 
familiar; this new hindrance is called ―libel tourism.‖  The new 
phenomenon ultimately eradicates our Constitutionally-protected 
First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of the press.  
This legal loophole of ―libel tourism‖ refers to ―obtaining libel 
judgments in foreign countries where libel laws do not have the free 
speech protections‖1 as this country affords, and subsequently 
trying to enforce such judgments here in the United States.  A 
person who is allegedly libeled ―can generally bring suit in any 
jurisdiction in which the libelous statement may have been 
published.‖2  Due to the rise in ―modern commerce,‖3 such as 
technological advances and Internet accessibility worldwide, a 
published document has the potential to show up in nearly any 
jurisdiction in the world.  ―Effectively . . . this means that a libel 
plaintiff can choose to sue virtually anywhere the work may have 
been sold,‖ with the detrimental effect of stripping ―U.S. authors of 
the protections they would have under U.S. law even though the 
publication occurred in the United States.‖4  Under doctrines of 
 
 1 Paul H. Aloe, Unraveling Libel Terrorism, 239 N.Y. L.J. 1, 4 (2008). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.; see also Raymond W. Beauchamp, England's Chilling Forecast: The 
Case for Granting Declaratory Relief to Prevent English Defamation Actions from 
Chilling American Speech, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3136 (2006). 
 4 Aloe, supra note 1, at 4. 
1
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reciprocity and comity, the U.S. can enforce foreign judgments that 
were rendered in countries that recognize and enforce U.S. 
judgments.  However, notions of comity espoused by the United 
Nations, international treaties, and federal and state legislation, 
which blindly enforce libel judgments rendered abroad, or fail to 
review them, simply undercut our domestic legal system, libel law, 
and our Constitutional right to freedom of speech. 
It may be tempting to justify giving preclusive effect to foreign 
judgments by citing the important U.S. policy considerations of res 
judicata.  The most important policies espoused by res judicata, 
fairness and consistency, however, fall by the wayside when 
American courts tolerate libel tourism.  It is neither consistent nor 
fair to enforce a libel judgment that would never have been 
rendered in any jurisdiction within the United States.  Our libel 
law is clear, and in the conflict between freedom of speech and 
protection of reputation that arises in libel cases, courts often favor 
the former.   
The First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press are widely recognized and treasured concepts under the 
law of the United States.  To undercut such by enforcing judgments 
that are generally inconsistent with these rights would have grave 
and detrimental effects on our citizens.  How can we tell American 
journalists to report the news and express themselves freely, while 
simultaneously allowing a foreign judgment to be enforced against 
them?  How can we allow laws contrary to our own to be victorious 
on our own soil?  Congress must be adamant in the protection of its 
citizens‘ freedoms afforded by the U.S. Constitution and give U.S. 
courts the jurisdiction to review foreign libel judgments, for either 
invalidation or enforcement. 
Part I of this comment explains the background and 
importance of the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and 
the press under the U.S. Constitution.  It also discusses defamation 
law in the United States and compares such to defamation laws 
abroad.  For example, England is one of the prime fora where 
defamation plaintiffs are much more likely to prevail than under 
U.S. law.  Part II will shed some light on libel tourism by discussing 
Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz,5 a seminal case which subsequently led to 
 
 5 Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 851 N.Y.S.2d 381 (2007). Biz Mahfouz, a Saudi 
national, obtained a libel judgment against New York journalist, Ehrenfeld.  When 
Ehrenfeld sought a declaratory judgment requesting that Mahfouz‘s libel 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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New York‘s adoption of section 302(d) of the New York Civil 
Practice Law and Rules (―N.Y. C.P.L.R.‖).6  Part III of this comment 
discusses the possibility of libel plaintiffs using doctrines of issue 
and claim preclusion in the United States after obtaining 
judgments abroad.  Such res judicata principles cannot properly be 
applied to such instances for the same reasons that foreign 
judgments cannot be blindly enforced in the United States. 
There must be broad jurisdictional power granted to United 
States courts to review foreign libel judgments because failure to do 
so could result in unlimited international forum shopping.  If a libel 
plaintiff tries to enforce such a judgment in the United States, 
there is no significant prejudice that can result from a United 
States court reviewing whether or not the judgment offends the law 
of the United States and its notions of justice.  If the federal and 
state governments adopt legislation similar to section 302(d) of the 
N.Y. C.P.L.R., which grants New York courts the jurisdiction to 
review libel judgments rendered abroad (even to simply invalidate 
the foreign judgment, not only to decide whether it is enforceable), 
then consistency, fairness, and the overall American legal system 
will not be threatened by the corrosive practice of libel tourism. 
This comment concludes by exploring possible solutions to libel 
 
judgment be deemed unenforceable on public policy and constitutional grounds, 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted 
Mahfouz‘s motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction.  On review, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's 
decision that there was no personal jurisdiction over Mahfouz, as he did not 
maintain the minimum contacts with New York requisite for the court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the matter.  Id. 
 6 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) (McKinney 2008).  ―The courts of this state shall have 
personal jurisdiction over any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation 
proceeding outside the United States against any person who is a resident of New 
York or is a person or entity amenable to jurisdiction in New York who has assets 
in New York or may have to take actions in New York to comply with the 
judgment, for the purposes of rendering declaratory relief with respect to that 
person's liability for the judgment, and/or for the purpose of determining whether 
said judgment should be deemed non-recognizable . . . to the fullest extent 
permitted by the United States constitution, provided: 1. the publication at issue 
was published in New York, and 2. that resident or person amenable to 
jurisdiction in New York (i) has assets in New York which might be used to satisfy 
the foreign defamation judgment, or (ii) may have to take actions in New York to 
comply with the foreign defamation judgment. The provisions of this subdivision 
shall apply to persons who obtained judgments in defamation proceedings outside 
the United States prior to and/or after the effective date of this subdivision (April 
28, 2008).‖  Id. 
3
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tourism, including the amendment to Title 28 of the United States 
Code, which has been passed by the House of Representatives and 
is awaiting approval in the Senate.7  It is imperative for such 
legislation to be approved by the Senate, along with added 
jurisdictional power, as the right of free speech is looming in the 
balance.  Part IV also discusses the perpetuation of terrorism, 
which is a frequently overlooked impediment of libel tourism.  
Completely dismissing libel foreign judgments may place a strain 
on international relations where reciprocity is practiced.  Therefore, 
by giving American courts jurisdiction to review and a chance to 
invalidate those judgments that do not coincide with our law, such 
tension may be avoided because the judgment will not be simply 
and blindly disregarded due to its foreign nature. 
I.  WHY IT IS EASIER TO WIN ELSEWHERE: DEFAMATION 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 
A. Right to Freedom of Speech/Press & U.S. Libel Law 
―Congress shall make no law . . . prohibit[ing] the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .‖8  
―Freedom of speech and press, historically considered and taken up 
by the Federal Constitution, means principally, although not 
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship.‖9  
The First Amendment is embedded in our legal system primarily to 
promote the expression and the dissemination of ideas without the 
fear of persecution by the government.  The pre-Revolution 
colonists, similar to the English, feared prosecution if they 
expressed any opinion contrary or offensive to the Crown.  As a 
primary notion of liberty, the founding fathers intentionally 
ensured that free-dom of expression would be an inherent right 
granted to all in this newly independent country. 
The 18th-century framers of the U.S. Constitution guaranteed 
 
 7 H.R. REP. NO. 110-6146 (2008) (This bill, known as the ‗Cohen-Issa libel 
tourism bill,‘ . . . will amend U.S. code to prohibit recognition and enforcement of 
foreign defamation judgments.)  Congressman Steven Cohen, Libel Tourism Bill 
Passes, available at http://cohen.house.gov/index.php 
option=com_content&task=view&id=639&Itemid=124.  
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 9 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 454 (2008). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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freedom of the press by writing that protection into the First 
Amendment of the Bill of Rights.  Even so, the Supreme Court of 
the United States—the highest court in America—for years refused 
to protect the media from libel lawsuits that relied on the First 
Amendment.  Instead, libel laws varied from state to state without 
a single coherent rule in the nation.10 
As the country began to develop, the importance of free speech 
in a flourishing democratic nation, envisioned by the founding 
fathers, began to take hold.  Thus, as history shows, freedom of 
speech was long protected and supreme in comparison to any rights 
and protections of reputation.  Today, ―hundreds of libel lawsuits 
are filed against newspapers, magazines, and radio and television 
stations in the United States.‖11  However, few are successful when 
it is clear that a libel defendant‘s First Amendment rights will be 
seriously abridged if prevented to express their views freely.  One 
important motivation behind this protection is to stimulate public 
debate, especially concerning politics.  Although veracity of the 
allegedly libelous statement is presumed, the libel plaintiff has the 
opportunity to disprove this presumption.  The libel plaintiff has to 
prove the falsity of the defamatory statement to prevail; falsity of 
the statement is an essential element to a libel claim.12  If falsity is 
proved, then freedom of speech is no longer a defense.13  The 
Constitution is not intended to protect intentional 
misrepresentations or malicious statements about others. 
In the United States, ―a communication is defamatory if it 
tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the 
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with him.‖14  Unlike slander, which is an oral 
form of defamation, libel is a written form of defamation which does 
not require actual proof of harm to be actionable.  Therefore, it may 
seem like this is a small hurdle to overcome, and that libel suits 
require a low burden of proof for a plaintiff.  However, after the 
seminal case of N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, the law ―established the 
 
 10 Steven Pressman, An Unfettered Press: Libel Law in the United States, 
http://usinfo.org/enus/government/overview/libellaw.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2010). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
5
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Constitutional standard to be applied in libel and defamation 
cases.‖15  ―The Supreme Court‘s decision in NY Times Co. v. 
Sullivan16 was an expansive decision, making the Court‘s first 
constitutional foray into defamation law a bold one.‖17  ―The Court 
held that in order for a plaintiff who is a public official to succeed 
with a defamation claim against a defendant whose speech is 
directed at the plaintiff‘s official duties, the plaintiff must show 
with clear and convincing evidence that the speech was made with 
‗actual malice,‘ meaning that the defendant had knowledge that the 
speech was false or acted with reckless disregard as to the truth.‖18  
NY Times Co. v. Sullivan infused the First Amendment protections 
into the standard for determining libel suits.  ―Libel can claim no 
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitation.‖19 
―In actions concerning private figures, the justifications in NY 
Times Co. . . . are not as readily applicable.‖20  Because private 
figures do not have a public platform to address defamatory 
statements or the power to defend against such, private citizens are 
given less of a hurdle to cross in a libel suit.  All that private figures 
have to prove is falsity of the alleged defamatory statement.21  
While the First Amendment continues to be a consideration, a 
plaintiff who is a public figure has a much greater burden to 
overcome in satisfying the aforementioned constitutional 
requirements.  Private plaintiffs must simply show evidence of the 
defamatory statement‘s falsity, while public figures have to show 
 
 15 Heather Maly, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don’t Publish at All: Forum 
Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Un-Guaranteed, 
14 J.L. & POL‘Y 883, 893 (2006). 
 16 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). When a N.Y. newspaper 
published an advertisement concerning grievances, alleged abuses and seeking 
support for the movement known as the ―Negro Right to Vote‖ movement, the 
Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama brought a libel suit against the paper.  
When the circuit court, affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama, entered a 
$500,000 judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, claiming that the judgment below 
was ―constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of 
speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his 
official conduct . . . .‖ Id. 
 17 Beauchamp, supra note 3, at 3083. 
 18 Id. 
 19 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269. 
 20 Maly, supra note 15, at 895. 
 21 Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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the defendant‘s actual knowledge of its falsity or actual malice to 
prevail in a libel action.22  Nevertheless, there is still some 
threshold in the United States to prove that the statement was 
false and that burden is rightfully placed on the plaintiff (public or 
private). 
B. Freedom of Speech & Libel Laws Abroad: An Easier Judgment 
1. England: The Libel Capital 
 
There are no similar First Amendment protections outside of 
the United States, and this is especially true in England.  Hence, 
free speech abroad is often an afterthought to a more important 
and more protected right of reputation. 
In England, defamatory statements by their nature are presumed 
false.  A defendant may, as a defense, plead that his statements were 
true and  thus justified.  However, to mount this defense, the 
defendant must prove the substantial truth of every material fact.  A 
material fact is defined as  anything that ‗adds weight to the 
imputation.‘  Proving truth is no simple task.23 
Therefore, there is an extremely large burden on the defendant to 
unequivocally prove every detail of his statement, which in essence 
turns out to be almost impossible in the majority of cases.  Hence, 
English libel law affords an opportunity to bring a frivolous suit in 
a foreign forum, and places a nearly impossible burden in the 
hands of a defendant, who would have otherwise had a valid 
defense in the United States. 
In the United States, the plaintiff has to meet his burden of 
proof in order to establish the statement‘s falsity before the burden 
shifts to the defendant.  This seems to be reasonable, as the one 
seeking the relief should initially be required to prove why such 
relief should be granted in light of the possibility that the 
defendant‘s freedom of speech may be stifled.  Although there are 
some free speech considerations in the United Kingdom, English 
jurisprudence clearly gives more credence to the protection of 
 
 22 Id. at 897. 
 23 Beauchamp, supra note 3, at 3078. 
7
    
276 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  22:1 
reputation.24  The Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz case demonstrates ―how 
the British libel laws are used to circumvent the stricter American 
laws.‖25 
2.  Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz 
In the recent New York case, Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, Rachel 
Ehrenfeld sought declaratory relief asking the court to invalidate a 
libel default judgment entered against her in England.  Dr. 
Ehrenfeld‘s book, Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed-and 
How to Stop It, focused on international terrorism, as this was her 
specialty and area of expertise.26  In the book, she asserts that the 
―defendant . . . Mahfouz (a Saudi Arabian businessman), financier 
and former head of the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia 
. . . provided direct and indirect monetary support to al Qaeda and 
other ‗Islamist terrorist groups.‘‖27  The book was published in the 
United States; twenty-three copies, however, were purchased in the 
United Kingdom and a chapter of the book was accessible on ABC 
news‘ website.28  This gave Mahfouz the opportunity to bring a libel 
suit in Britain without having to prove Ehrenfeld‘s statements to be 
false.  Moreover, actual malice or actual knowledge of falsity was 
not a consideration to the English court, as the initial burden of 
proof was on the defendant, Ehrenfeld, to prove the truth of the 
statements in her book.  Additionally, free speech concerns were of 
little consequence to the English court.  Ehrenfeld ―elected not to 
appear in the English action [as defendant]. . . because [of] the 
costs, . . . the procedural barriers facing a libel defendant under 
English law, and her disagreement in principle with the 
defendant‘s alleged attempt to chill her speech in New York by 
suing in a claimant-friendly libel jurisdiction in which she lacked 
any tangible connection.‖29 
The English court returned a default judgment for the plaintiff, 
Mahfouz, against absent Ehrenfeld in the amount of £10,000 
($15,681) intended for Mahfouz and each of his sons.30  Further, 
 
 24 See generally id.; Maly, supra note 15. 
 25 Maly, supra note 15, at 906. 
 26 Ehrenfeld, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 383-84. 
 27 Id. at 832. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 832-33. 
 30 Id. at 833. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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Ehrenfeld was required under the English judgment to give a 
public apology to the plaintiff.31  Lastly, the court granted a 
permanent injunction against allowing her book, now considered to 
be defamatory, to enter England and awarded legal fees to 
Mahfouz.32 
Ehrenfeld then brought her own action in the States, seeking 
―a declaratory judgment that, under federal and New York law, 
defendant could not prevail on a libel claim against her based upon 
the statements at issue in the English action and that the . . . 
default judgment is unenforceable in the United States and, 
particularly, in New York State.‖33 
The New York Court of Appeals ultimately decided that they 
would first need personal jurisdiction over Mahfouz to consider 
Ehrenfeld‘s claim.34  Libel tourism was not an issue that they 
wanted to address if personal jurisdiction was lacking, and 
ultimately the court found that under International Shoe35 and its 
progeny, there were not enough meaningful or minimum contacts 
with New York to warrant jurisdiction over Mahfouz.36  ―The Court 
was unmoved that free speech principles were involved, that the 
defendant had owned condominiums in New York City or that he 
had been indicted by a grand jury and was a defendant in several 
civil actions arising out of the September 11th terrorist attacks.‖37  
Therefore, Ehrenfeld‘s claim was dismissed based on lack of 
personal jurisdiction, and the court swept the issue of libel tourism 
under the carpet.  Although the New York Court failed to 
invalidate the judgment based on jurisdictional grounds, the 
English judgment could not actually be enforced in New York 
 
 31 Ehrenfeld, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 883. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See generally id. 
 35 See generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) 
(When the Defendant, a company based in Delaware, failed to pay unemployment 
to the State of Washington, the courts ultimately concluded that Washington had 
personal jurisdiction over the matter, because the defendants had ―minimum 
contacts‖ with the State to warrant in personam jurisdiction.  The court developed 
the minimum contacts test to determine whether a court has personal jurisdiction 
over a litigant). 
 36 See generally Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 851 N.Y.S.2d 381 (2007). 
 37 Paul H. Aloe, 2006-2007 Survey of New York Law: Article: Civil Practice, 58 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 713, 742 (2008). 
9
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unless Mahfouz sued to domesticate it in New York.38  Although 
Mahfouz did not try to enforce the judgment in New York, speech 
was chilled nonetheless, as Ehrenfeld‘s United Kingdom publisher 
promptly ceased publication of her book in the United Kingdom 
based on the English judgment.  Therefore, New York‘s failure to 
invalidate the judgment was indeed harmful to Ehrenfeld and free 
expression generally.  However, ―the story did not end there . . . 
because the case drew a reaction from the New York Legislature in 
the form of the so-called ‗Libel Terrorism Bill.‘‖39 
3. N.Y.‘s Response to Ehrenfeld; The Libel Terrorism Bill 
The court decided in Ehrenfeld that section 302 of the N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. did not confer jurisdiction to New York, in order to declare 
a British libel judgment invalid.  Following this decision, section 
302 was amended to create an expansive long arm statute allowing 
―nonrecognition of certain foreign libel judgments.40 
The Libel Terrorism Protection Act . . . creates a specific 
ground for nonrecognition of such judgments.  This new subdivision 
. . . provides:  
 
(d) Foreign defamation judgment. The courts of this state shall have 
personal jurisdiction over any person who obtains a judgment in a 
defamation proceeding outside the United States against any 
person who is a resident of New York or is a person or entity 
amenable to jurisdiction in New York who has assets in New York 
or may have to take actions in New York to comply with the 
judgment, for the purposes of rendering declaratory relief with 
respect to that person‘s liability for the judgment, and/or for the 
purpose of determining whether said judgment should be deemed 
non-recognizable pursuant to section fifty-three hundred four of this 
chapter, to the fullest extent permitted by the United States 
Constitution, provided:1) the publication at issue was published in 
New York, and 2) that resident or person amenable to jurisdiction 
in New York (i) has assets in New York which might be used to 
satisfy the foreign defamation judgment, or (ii) may have to take 
actions in New York to comply with the foreign defamation 
 
 38 Id. at 743. 
 39 Aloe, supra note 1, at 3. 
 40 Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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judgment.‖41 
In addition to giving New York long arm jurisdiction to deal 
with matters described above, The Libel Terrorism Act also amends 
New York‘s version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act of 2005, section 5304 of the N.Y. 
C.P.L.R.  Before the amendment, ―[the New York] Court of Appeals 
mandated that . . . foreign judgments are generally to be 
recognized, even where the underlying cause of action is not one 
that would give rise to relief in New York.‖42  However, section 
5304(b)(8) now: 
 
[P]ermits nonrecognition where the cause of action resulted in a 
defamation judgment obtained in a jurisdiction outside the 
United States, unless the court before which the matter is 
brought sitting in this state first determines that the defamation 
law applied in the foreign court‘s adjudication provided at least as 
much protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as 
would be provided by both the United States and New York 
constitutions.43 
Reciprocity has long been a requirement of enforcing a foreign 
judgment in the United States.  The late nineteenth century 
Supreme Court case of Hilton v. Guyot, held that the United States 
would not enforce foreign judgments from countries that did not 
extend the same courtesy. 
 
[J]udgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign 
country, by the laws of which our own judgments are 
reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and 
conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima 
facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiffs‘ claim.44 
However, this requirement has almost become moot.  Since almost 
all developed nations have reciprocity with the United States today, 
the question now becomes whether the foreign judgment is 
repugnant to our legal system and therefore should not be enforced.  
Reciprocity can never be dispositive in determining foreign 
judgment enforcement. 
 
 41 Id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) (McKinney 2008). 
 42 Aloe, supra note 1, at 5. 
 43 Id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2008). 
 44 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 123 (1895). 
11
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Although under principles of reciprocity and comity, 
recognition of foreign judgments may seem fair and conducive to a 
working relationship between nations, libel tourism is an 
illustration of how this courtesy can be abused.  Without the type of 
legislation enacted in New York, litigants can go to a foreign nation 
where libel is often a strict liability tort.45  This offers an 
opportunity for plaintiffs to engage in forum shopping by bringing a 
suit in another country in order to make an ―end run‖ around the 
First Amendment.46  There are countries other than England that 
allow for such behavior.  For example, ―Singapore has been called a 
‗libel paradise,‘ and New Zealand, Kyrgyzstan, and Australia are 
also noted for being friendly to plaintiffs.‖47  ―So many options for 
the libel tourist only heighten the problem, as well as the demand 
for an American solution.‖48 
4. Singapore: A Libel Paradise 
Singapore is called a ―libel paradise‖ for a good reason.  A 
defamation suit usually leads to a prompt settlement, rarely 
reaching litigation, because the defendants know that defending a 
defamation suit in Singapore is virtually a sure defeat.  In 2002, 
Singapore‘s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong, and Lee‘s eldest son, Deputy Prime Minister, all 
brought a libel suit against the United States business news wire 
Bloomberg.49  The subject of the alleged libel was an article written 
by a Bloomberg contributor regarding concerns of nepotism after 
Lee appointed his daughter-in-law to a high government position.50  
It was only a mere three weeks from the time the article was 
published to the time that the parties settled.51  This was one of the 
speediest settlements ever recorded.  Bloomberg seemed to be 
cognizant of the long history of victorious defamation lawsuits 
 
 45 Michael F. Sutton, Legislating the Tower of Babel: International Restrictions 
on Internet Content and the Marketplace of Ideas, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 417, 422 
(2004). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Beauchamp, supra note 3, at 3076. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Eric Ellis, Singapore Authorities Use Libel Laws to Silence Critics, 
AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 26, 2002,   http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020926 
au.htm. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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brought primarily by Singapore‘s leaders.  ―Foreign publishers have 
spent millions in fruitless attempts to defend libel actions brought 
against titles that have earned an international reputation for 
accuracy and credibility . . . no foreign publisher has ever 
successfully defended a libel action in a Singapore court when 
opposing a Singapore politician.‖52  However, the article in the 
Bloomberg matter was never published in Singapore, it only 
appeared on Bloomberg‘s website.53  Bloomberg employed 180 
persons in Singapore and had over 3000 subscribers that it did not 
want to lose.54  Bloomberg‘s acquiescence to Singapore‘s libel haven 
was understandable considering its economic interests in 
Singapore.  However, the article that was the center of the dispute 
was removed from their website, chilling any expression of 
opposition or concern over the affairs of Singapore‘s ruling party.  
As a result, another haven for libel tourists continues to quiet 
American speech. 
5. Australia: Another Easy Judgment 
Australia and the United States share their legal roots in 
English common law; however, they have diverged onto two distinct 
paths when it comes to defamation law.55  The battle between 
freedom of speech, reputation, and privacy plays out differently in 
Australia than in the United States.  Australia holds ―reputational 
and privacy interests‖56 in higher regard than free speech.  The 
difference may be attributed to the fact that the First Amendment 
rights afforded by the United States Constitution explicitly 
safeguard free speech, while Australia has no such constitutional 
safeguard. 
Also, Australian defamation law does not have ―anything 
comparable to the requirement in the United States that public 
figures suing for defamation demonstrate that the defendant acted 
‗with actual malice‘—that is, with knowledge that the defamatory 
statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Ellis, supra note 49.  
 55 Michael Newcity, The Sociology of Defamation in Australia and the United 
States, 26 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 1, 2 (1991). 
 56 Id. at 4. 
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false or not.‖57  Australian lawmakers defend this lack of a special 
requirement for public figures by arguing that it would be unjust to 
add an extra burden to those in the public eye, simply because of 
their status.58  Due to the fact that ―Australia is a commonwealth 
organized under the authority of the British monarchy,‖59 the 
falsity of the alleged libelous statement is presumed, which places 
the burden on the defendant of a libel suit to prove veracity.60 
The 2001 Australian case of Gutnick v. Dow Jones61 is a prime 
example of how libel tourism works.  Gutnick, an Australian 
entrepreneur, obtained a libel judgment against Dow Jones for 
alleged defamatory information that appeared on the Wall Street 
Journal‘s website, of which many subscribers were from 
Australia.62  Dow Jones appealed to the High Court of Australia, 
contending that Australia‘s libel laws chilled American notions of 
free speech and that the court did not have jurisdiction over the 
matter.  The High Court responded by affirming the libel judgment, 
reasoning that the Internet allowed for Australian subscriptions 
and that ―common law adapts even to radically different 
environments,‖63 such as the World Wide Web.  Since the Internet 
was allowing for the dissemination of Dow Jones‘s articles in 
Australia, then Dow Jones could rightfully be bound by the laws of 
Australia.  Now, what happens when foreign libel plaintiffs try to 
enforce their judgments in the United States? 
 
 57 Id. at 3 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Blake Cooper, The U.S. Libel Law Conundrum and the Necessity of 
Defensive Corporate Measures in Lessening International Internet Libel Liability, 
21 CONN. J. INT'L L. 127, 139 (2005). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2002/56.html.  ―Joseph Gutnick, an 
Australian international entrepreneur with business connections in the U.S., sued 
Dow Jones, publisher of Barron's Magazine, a financial publication focused mainly 
on developments in the U.S. markets, in Victoria, Australia, over the content of an 
article . . . which alleged Mr. Gutnick was the chief customer of Nachum Goldberg, 
a convicted tax-evading money launderer, and that Gutnick also had evaded taxes 
and laundered money through Goldberg, using his influence with Goldberg to buy 
Goldberg's silence.‖  Cooper, supra note 59, at 141-42. 
 62 Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.). available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2002/56.html. 
 63 Id. ¶ 90; see also Kurt Wimmer, Toward a World Rule of Law: Freedom of 
Expression, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 202, 207 (2006). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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C. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
The doctrine of comity64 has been followed in the United States 
common law for many years.  ―Foreign judgments are deemed to be 
‗valid‘ if the foreign court properly asserted personal jurisdiction 
and if the foreign tribunal utilized procedures that were not 
fundamentally unfair.‖65  ―If these conditions are met, the 
Restatement instructs that the foreign judgment should be enforced 
unless ‗the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of 
what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is 
sought.‘‖66  This is considered to be the public policy exception to 
enforcement of foreign judgments.  Further, the United States is a 
party to the Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, an international treaty which goes 
beyond foreign judgments and allows for reciprocal members to 
enforce arbitral awards country to country.67  While these treaties 
and laws seem to promote uniformity and recognition across 
borders, there are still limitations.  ―‗Comity,‘ in the legal sense, is 
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of 
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.‖68 
 
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another 
nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its laws.69 
Section 4 of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act of 2005, gives a list of limitations on foreign 
 
 64 Comity is ―a practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of 
different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, 
and judicial acts.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (8th ed. 2004). 
 65 Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 783, 792 (2004) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 
92(1971)). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force in the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970), available at http://treaties.un. 
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-
1&chapter=22&lang=en#EndDec. 
 68 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64. 
 69 Id. 
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judgment enforcement.  Grounds for non-recognition of a foreign 
judgment are as follows: 
 
(1)  the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not 
receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the 
defendant to  defend; (2)  the foreign-country judgment was 
obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an adequate 
opportunity to present its case; (3)  the foreign-country 
judgment or the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the 
foreign-country judgment is based is repugnant to the public 
policy of this state or of the United States; (4) the foreign-
country judgment conflicts with another final andconclusive 
judgment; (5)  the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary 
to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute 
in question was to be determined otherwise than by 
proceedings in that foreign court; (6) in the case of jurisdiction 
based only on personal service, the foreign court was a 
seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action; (7) the 
foreign-country judgment was rendered in circumstances that 
raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering 
court with respect to the foreign-country judgment; or (8) the 
specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the foreign-
country judgment was not compatible with the requirements of 
due process of law.70 
Many factors of non-recognition could have been found in the 
Ehrenfeld case.  Nevertheless, the general majority of libel tourism 
cases fall within the third limitation of the act, which does not hold 
a judgment viable for recognition if the cause or claim is repugnant 
to public policy.  The fora where libel tourists shop often presume 
falsity of an allegedly defamatory statement, as discussed above, 
which in essence creates a presumption of guilt that is extremely 
difficult to overcome.  Furthermore, the protections of the First 
Amendment and admiration for free speech are not shared by these 
frequently shopped nations.  Procedural rules and evidentiary rules 
are also not aligned with the United States.  The foregoing reasons 
illustrate the distaste and incompatibility such foreign libel 
judgments exude from our domestic libel law—a general 
repugnance.  Therefore, a foreign plaintiff has a great opportunity 
 
 70 UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c) (2005) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ 
ulc/fnact99/1920_69/ufmjra62.pdf. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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to obtain a libel judgment from an American defendant abroad. 
II.  RES JUDICATA 
A libel plaintiff may try to enforce a foreign libel judgment in 
the United States through principles of res judicata if the court 
refuses to enforce such a judgment based on the non-recognition 
factors listed in section 4(c) of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act.  Professor Jay Carlisle describes the 
doctrine of res judicata as referring to: 
 
[A] variety of concepts dealing with the preclusive effects of a 
judgment on subsequent litigation.  Claim preclusion is the 
doctrine that once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all 
other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or 
if seeking a different remedy.  Issue preclusion basically 
precludes a party from re-litigating in a subsequent action or 
proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or 
proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, 
whether the tribunals or causes of action are the same.  Its 
typical application occurs when one of the parties to a civil 
action argues that preclusive effect should be given to one or 
more issues determined in an earlier civil action between the 
same parties in the same jurisdiction.71 
These principles have been used by foreign litigants in United 
States courts trying to give preclusive effect to issues already 
litigated in a foreign country.  In 1999, the case of Smith v. 
Toronto-Dominion Bank gave a Canadian judgment preclusive 
effect in the Tenth Circuit.72  The court contended that there was 
―no reason why the two Canadian judgments, which decided the 
parties‘ rights concerning the two underlying mortgages, should be 
 
 71 Jay Carlisle, Second Circuit 1999-2000 Res Judicata Developments, 20 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 75, 76 (2000). 
 72 Smith v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, No. 98-4008, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1184, 
at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 19, 1999). Smith, the plaintiff, held a mortgage with the 
defendant, a Canadian bank, for a Canadian condominium that plaintiff owned. 
Id.  In 1994, the bank brought suit in Toronto, Canada for delinquent payments on 
the mortgage. Id. A default judgment was entered against Smith in the Toronto 
court. Id.  In this case, Smith brought suit for wrongful foreclosure on the 
mortgage, and the lower court, affirmed here, granted summary judgment for the 
defendants based on the 1994 Canadian judgment that decided the issue of 
foreclosure and payment delinquency against Smith. Id. 
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denied recognition in this case.‖73  The court stated, however, that 
issue preclusion can only apply if ―Utah law would recognize a 
judgment rendered by a Canadian court.‖74  In its analysis, the 
court cited Hilton v. Guyot: 
 
 [T]he principles of comity require recognition of a foreign 
judgment if there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial 
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the 
trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary 
appearance of the defendant, and under a system of 
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of 
justice between the citizens of its own country and those of 
other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in 
the court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, 
or fraud in procuring the judgment.75 
Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff had a full and fair 
opportunity to be heard in the Canadian proceeding and gave 
recognition to the Canadian judgment and its preclusive effect on 
the United States case. 
It is clear from the court‘s analysis that in order to give a 
foreign judgment preclusive effect in the United States, that 
judgment must be recognizable by United States courts under the 
doctrine of comity and the Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act.  In other words, recognition of a 
judgment is a prerequisite to giving it preclusive effect.  A foreign 
litigant cannot try to use res judicata principles when a foreign 
judgment is repugnant to U.S. law, or when an American defendant 
is deprived of due process considerations.  An issue of liability 
under a libel claim may turn on different facts in different fora.  For 
example, if Mahfouz was to bring suit in the U.S., as opposed to 
England, the fact that he was a public official would place a heavier 
burden on him to prove actual malice on the part of Ehrenfeld.  
Therefore, the issue turned on different facts and subsequent 
burden of proof specific to English law, hence, cannot be given the 
same effect in this country.  ―To be entitled to any recognition, then, 
the foreign court‘s proceedings must have comported with 
American ideas of fundamental fairness, including our concept of 
 
 73 Id. at *16. 
 74 Id. at *5. 
 75 Id. at *6 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895)). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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the permissible bases for personal jurisdiction.‖76 
In 1992, New York Supreme Court refused to give recognition 
or preclusive effect to an English libel judgment in the case of 
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.77 Although this was a 
case of first impression in New York, the Supreme Court held that 
they were not able to enforce or give any weight to the English 
judgment, due to the fact that it did not ―comport with the 
constitutional standards for adjudicating libel claims.‖78  Moreover, 
it was determined that the standards used by the High Court of 
England did not meet the safeguards of the right to freedom of 
speech or freedom of the press available in the United States.79  
Under English law, any published statement, which adversely 
affects a person‘s reputation or the respect in which that person is 
held, is prima facie defamatory.80  ―A plaintiff‘s only burden is to 
establish that the words complained of that refer to them, were 
published by the defendant, and bear a defamatory meaning . . . .‖81  
Statements of fact are to be presumed false and the defendant must 
plead justification for the issue of truth to be brought before the 
jury.82 
In the United States, the burden of proving truth is not placed 
on the libel defendant; rather, the burden of proving falsity of the 
statement is placed on the plaintiff.  To do otherwise, or to follow 
English libel law, would be considered ―unconstitutional, because 
fear of liability may deter‖83 free speech.  Such a chilling of free 
speech would be accomplished by enforcing English libel judgments 
in the United States, and the court would decide that the 
 
 76 Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose 
Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 71 (1984). 
 77 Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992). The (libel) 
―judgment was granted in an action brought in the High Court of Justice in 
London, England, by an Indian national against the New York operator of a news 
service which transmits reports only to a news service in India. The story held to 
be defamatory was written by a reporter in London, wired by defendant to the 
news service in India, which sent it to newspapers there.  It was reported in two 
Indian newspapers, copies of which were distributed in the United Kingdom.‖  Id. 
at 661. 
 78 Id. at 662. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 663. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664. 
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―protection of free speech and the press embodied in . . . [the First] 
[A]mendment [of the United States Constitution] would be 
seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel judgments 
granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but 
considered antithetical to the protections afforded the press by the 
US Constitution.‖84 
III. ENDING THE TOURISM 
A.  The Cohen-Issa Libel Tourism Bill 
The Ehrenfeld case prompted New York to act by extending 
New York‘s long-arm statute, but one state‘s endeavor seems to be 
a miniscule victory in the larger jurisdictional scheme of the 
country. 
As a step in the right direction, the House of Representatives, 
led by Tennessee‘s Ninth District Representative, Steve Cohen, 
recently passed the ―Cohen-Issa Libel Tourism Bill‖ (hereinafter 
―the Libel Tourism bill‖).  This bill has enjoyed bipartisan support 
and passed unanimously in fall of 2008.85  Ratification is now 
pending in the U.S. Senate.  The bill will amend Title 28 of the 
United States Code (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) to ―prohibit 
recognition and enforcement of foreign defamation judgments.‖86  
The legislative findings were as follows: 
 
(1) The [F]irst amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States prohibits the abridgment of freedom of speech.  (2) 
Freedom of speech is fundamental to the values of American 
democracy.  (3) In light of the constitutional protection our 
Nation affords to freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has 
modified the elements of the common law tort of defamation to 
provide more protection for  defendants than would be available 
at common law, including providing special protections for 
political speech.  (4) The courts of other countries, including 
those  that otherwise share our Nation‘s common law and due 
process traditions, are not constrained by the first amendment 
and thus may provide less protection to  defamation defendants 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 H.R. REP. NO. 110-6146 (2008). 
 86 Id. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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than our Constitution requires.   (5) While our Nation‘s courts 
will generally enforce foreign judgments as a matter of comity, 
comity  does not require that courts enforce foreign judgments 
that are repugnant to our  Nation‘s fundamental constitutional 
values, in particular its strong protection of the right to 
freedom of speech.  (6) Our Nation‘s courts should only enforce 
foreign judgments as a matter of comity when such foreign 
judgments are consistent with the right to freedom of speech.87 
These findings are consistent with most of the concerns 
expressed in this comment.  The foregoing concerns have thankfully 
prompted Congress to action, and hopefully the Senate will ratify 
this legislation.  If ratified, this bill will essentially amend Chapter 
181 ―Foreign Judgments‖ of Title 28 of the United States Code, as 
follows: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a 
domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment 
for defamation that is based upon a publication concerning a 
public figure or a matter of public concern unless the domestic 
court determines that the foreign judgment is consistent with 
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.88 
This ratification will notably give the United States‘ courts the 
power to refuse to enforce damages against defendants who are 
faced with libel suits similar to the defendant in Ehrenfeld.  
However, the bill only concerns public figures and matters of public 
concern.  Therefore, defendants cannot use this proposed legislation 
to escape foreign libel judgments where the plaintiff is a private 
figure.  This does not warrant much discussion because it is an 
improbable or rare circumstance that would lead to such a case.  
Unlike public figures, private libel claimants usually find their 
allegedly defamatory statements published locally rather than 
abroad.  The situations that would allow a private libel plaintiff to 
sue abroad are too remote to warrant discussion in this comment. 
However, the more tangible problem with the Libel Tourism 
bill lies in the fact that it has not yet been passed and the potential 
for presidential veto (if and when it is ratified by the Senate) has 
risen since January 20, 2009 and after President Barack Obama 
 
 87 Id. § 1(a). 
 88 Id. § 2. 
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has taken office.  President Obama was widely criticized during his 
presidential campaign for implementing a police force in Missouri 
during the final days leading up to the 2008 Presidential Election.  
This police force was said to be ordered to ―threaten libel 
prosecutions against Obama‘s political opposition‖ if anyone was to 
speak out against Obama in a misleading or false way.89  Free 
speech activists and many of the conservative Obama opposition 
point out that free speech and free press is the cornerstone of 
politics and freedom.90  Open public debate is to be encouraged, 
even if it calls for public questioning of candidates running for the 
most powerful position in the country.  If libel suits are used to 
threaten any political opposition that may question a candidate‘s 
views and background, then free speech will be stifled.  Hence, 
there is a good possibility that if the President holds reputation and 
conformity in higher regard than free speech, the Libel Tourism bill 
may never leave the President‘s desk. 
As the law stands today, the individual states, most of which 
have adopted the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act, have the discretion to enforce a foreign libel 
judgment based on the policy consideration exception in the Act, 
supra.  Therefore, the Libel Tourism bill only creates a national 
recognition of an existing law, which is already in force in various 
individual states.91  This bill identifies ―the principles that guide 
recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments and 
attempts to create a national solution in the form of a coherent 
federal statute.‖92  The American Law Institute and other legal 
scholars feel that this national recognition is necessary and more 
―precise‖ than the already existing state laws.93  In effect, however, 
it stands almost identical to already existing state laws that 
address the enforcement of foreign judgments.  Therefore, while 
 
 89 Andrew C. McCarthy, Obama’s Assault on the First Amendment, NAT‘L REV. 
ONLINE, Oct. 1, 2008, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=M2MxMW 
JlNzcwMDU3ZTJkYjRmZjU3N2U0OGNlZmE1ZDg=&w=MA==. (McCarthy 
admonishes Obama – ―The Prophet of Change is only to be admired, not 
questioned.‖). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6146 (2009) (statement of 
Linda J. Silberman, Martin Lipton Professor of Law, N.Y.U). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
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national awareness is extremely important and provides a step in 
the right direction, national legislation is still lacking a cohesive 
element that would adequately combat libel tourism. 
B. Proposed Legislation is Lacking: What Needs to be Done 
1. The Greatest Overlooked Concern of Libel Tourism: Terrorism 
While the words tourism and terrorism look and sound 
extremely similar, it was no mistake when New York named their 
anti-libel tourism act the ―Libel Terrorism Bill.‖  Terrorism has its 
long claws deeply embedded into free speech.  Most of the Middle 
East does not recognize freedom of expression, and radical Islamist-
associated terrorist groups, like al Qaeda, will try to quell the 
disturbances resulting from free speech concerning their 
organizations.  There are many wealthy Middle Eastern 
businessmen who share the same fundamentalist views with the 
same types of terrorists, or even the same terrorists, that attacked 
the United States on September 11, 200194.  For example, 
Ehrenfeld tried to expose those who financially fund terrorism, 
such as Saudi businessman, Mahfouz.  Mahfouz once ran the 
largest bank in Saudi Arabia and had connections with the royal 
family of Saudi Arabia.  ―There is no freedom of expression in Saudi 
Arabia, so it is the duty of others to expose what is happening.  
With the help of British libel lawyers, Mr. Mahfouz has launched 
thirty-three suits against those who are investigating this 
important area of public concern.‖95 
When power and money meet terror and hate, the result is a 
catastrophe, as evidenced by the September 11, 2001 attack.  One 
of the most patriotic acts occurs when a journalist does his job, ―a 
job that is defined and defended by the First Amendment . . . posing 
questions, raising concerns, exposing mistakes, and voicing dissent 
are . . . essential to the national interest . . . .‖96  It is difficult to 
 
 94 Dore Gold, The Saudi State and Terrorism, MIDDLE E. FORUM, Apr. 4, 2003, 
http://www.meforum.org/537/the-saudi-state-and-terrorism. 
 95 Dominic Kennedy, MPs Accuse Courts of Allowing Libel Tourism; Britain 
'Being Used for Soviet-style Censorship’, TIMES (London), Dec. 18, 2008, at 27, 
available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/ law/article5362364.ece. 
 96 Steven V. Roberts, Patriot and Professionals: Journalists as Responsible 
Citizens, in RIGHTS VS. PUBLIC SAFETY AFTER 9/11; AMERICA IN THE AGE OF 
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disagree that an essential national and international interest is to 
uncover and combat terrorism.  One way to accomplish this end is 
to cut off the financial support to groups such as al Qaeda, Hamas, 
and the Taliban.  This starts with indentifying the wealthy and 
powerful men and women behind terrorist organizations.  Without 
funding, terrorism would cease to exist.  If the money sources are 
investigated, unveiled, and stopped, the likelihood of terrorist 
attacks would decrease. 
English courts have been criticized by their own law 
enforcement agencies ―of using ‗Soviet-style‘ English libel laws to 
help the rich and powerful to hide their secrets.‖97  An example is 
―the British-Iraqi businessman Nadhmi Auchi, who has a 
conviction for corruption in France and is linked to a fundraiser for 
Barack Obama, was accused of using the [English libel] law to stifle 
debate.‖98  Like Mahfouz, this is just another instance of a Saudi 
official trying to silence existing reports of his actions, while 
probably still funding terrorism.99  ―The chilling effect of 
international libel suits is not limited to the publication of 
information, but could also extend further to the investigative 
process.  The effect of these judgments could discourage other 
scholars from investigating terrorism funding or mentioning such 
individuals as Mr. Mahfouz by name.‖100  ―The media is a part of 
the intelligence process, and they can only fulfill their role as 
investigators with the support of the government and the law.‖101 
2. United States Jurisdiction to Invalidate Foreign Libel 
Judgments 
Some may argue that libel defendant Rachel Ehrenfeld never 
suffered any actual harm because Mahfouz never tried to enforce 
his English judgment in the United States.  However, more is to be 
said of the power to invalidate judgments, even in a similar 
situation such as Ehrenfeld‘s.  The new Libel Tourism bill 
(awaiting ratification by the Senate) appears to provide the answer 
 
TERRORISM 77 (Amitai Etzioni & Jason H. Marsh eds., 2003). 
 97 Id. at 77. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Beauchamp, supra note 3, at 3076. 
 100 Maly, supra note 15, at 934. 
 101 Id. at 935 (citing GEOFFREY ROBERTSON & ANDREW NICOL, MEDIA LAW 35 
(4th ed. 2002)). 
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to all problems resulting from libel tourism.  If the foreign 
judgment is not consistent with the First Amendment, then it will 
not be enforced in the United States.  However, there remains an 
unaddressed problem within the Libel Tourism bill because the bill 
does not speak of invalidating judgments, even when said 
judgments are not sought to be enforced in the United States. 
At first glance, the power to invalidate foreign judgments may 
seem like overreaching, but libel tourism will only be fully 
addressed when United States courts are given the jurisdiction to 
hear claims for declaratory relief seeking to invalidate foreign 
judgments.  Even if a foreign judgment is not sought to be enforced 
in the United States, it does not necessarily mean that the chilling 
effects on free speech do not remain.  In turn, because Ehrenfeld‘s 
book was essentially ―blacklisted‖ from England, there is a bleak 
possibility for future publications by the same publisher.  ―In her 
complaint filed in the Southern District of New York, Dr. Ehrenfeld 
claimed that ‗[i]f this action is dismissed, writers will be afraid to 
do their jobs properly and aggressively, and the search for the truth 
behind issues of the highest and most urgent public interest will be 
compromised.‘‖102  ―In the amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf 
of Dr. Ehrenfeld to the New York court, several members of the 
media and international communities jointly contended that[,] 
should the British judgment be allowed to stand, the impact would 
be felt by numerous authors and publishers alike by giving effect 
and credibility to the tactics of ‗libel tourists‘ such as Mahfouz.‖103  
Therefore, it appears that the effects of an unenforced judgment 
may be great.  Such judgments serve as deterrents to all other 
journalists from writing freely.  And for those that continue to 
write, the publishers are going to be circumspect of any material 
they publish that can subject them to a lawsuit.  For example, 
Cambridge University Press decided to scrap publishing plans for a 
book about jihad and radical Islam, because of fear of a libel action 
in English courts, ―which seem at the moment to side with those 
who finance extremism rather than those who seek to curb it.‖104  
 
 102 Maly, supra note 15, at 934 (referencing the Memorandum of Law 
submitted to the New York Supreme Court on behalf of Ehrenfeld). 
 103 Id. (quoting Brief for Amazon.com et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiffs, Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, No. 04-CV-09641, 2005 WL 696769 (S.D.N.Y 
Mar. 23, 2005)). 
 104 Kennedy, supra note 9. 
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England is not a remote country, and many publishers have offices 
and investments in England.  Therefore, they will not risk having 
their assets attached in a libel suit in order to publish material that 
will likely invite claims for libel.  In effect, the fear of libel suits not 
only chills free speech, but also freezes freedom of speech in its 
entirety. 
Personal jurisdiction, as espoused by International Shoe and its 
progeny, is not sufficient in matters concerning libel tourism.  If the 
courts are unable to establish that the defendant at issue 
maintained minimum contacts with the state, then the court will 
dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Although it could 
be argued that Mahfouz‘s ownership of condominiums in New York 
City constituted minimum contacts to warrant jurisdiction, the 
Court disagreed.  This is explicitly why the Libel Tourism bill, 
currently being reviewed by the Senate, is incomplete and needs to 
include a long arm jurisdictional element, as the New York‘s Libel 
Terrorism Protection Act does.  The New York statute states:  
 
The courts of this state shall have personal jurisdiction over 
any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation proceeding 
outside the United States against any person who is a resident 
of New York or is a person or entity amenable to jurisdiction in 
New York who has assets in New York or may have to take 
actions in New York to comply with the judgment.105  
This exemplifies the precise language needed yet currently lacking 
in the bill pending in the Senate.  Therefore, personal jurisdiction 
will be effectively asserted over the person who holds a libel 
judgment if the court has personal jurisdiction over the party 
against whom the judgment is rendered.  There is nothing unjust in 
declaring that if libel plaintiffs want to sue and obtain a judgment 
against an American defendant, then such plaintiffs must be 
prepared to have an American court review the judgment.  By 
expanding the reach to obtain personal jurisdiction, chilled speech 
will begin to thaw and foreign judgments repugnant to our 
constitutionally protected rights will be rightfully invalidated. 
Recently, other advocates for jurisdictional changes on a 
federal level to combat libel tourism believe that the legislation 
must be narrow and not lean toward a broad long-arm sweep.  Such 
 
 105 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) (McKinney 2008). 
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arguments are based upon the concern for overreaching and 
negative impacts on foreign relations.  Todd W. Moore of Fordham 
Law School recently advocated that Congress should start with a 
statute similar to New York‘s Libel Terrorism bill and add the 
―effects test‖ to the jurisdictional requirement.  Moore argues for a 
seemingly ―long-arm type‖ of legislation, and adds a minimum 
contacts test.  The ―effects test,‖ espoused in Calder v. Jones, is 
essentially the minimum contacts test for defamation suits.106  It 
provides that when a defamation action is brought, the work had to 
not only be published in the state to have jurisdiction, but also 
required that the harm from the allegedly defamatory statements 
must have had its primary effect in that state.107  However, adding 
the effects test to federal or state long-arm statutes simply 
undercuts the effectiveness of a long-arm statute.  The purpose of 
such a statute is to ―extend‖ jurisdictional reach to grab a 
defendant who otherwise would not be subject to personal 
jurisdiction under the minimum contacts test. 
Furthermore, Mr. Moore believes that review of libel foreign 
judgments should be limited to assessing enforcement only and 
should never invalidate such a judgment.108  He defends this 
position by stating that: 
 
Absent an international consensus on jurisdiction regarding 
unenforced foreign defamation judgments, the most the United 
States can do is protect its citizens within its own borders 
without unduly interfering with foreign sovereignties.  Given 
the legal variations between countries, the different standards 
used to enforce judgments from other nations, and the resulting 
difficulties in predicting foreign countries‘ enforcement of U.S. 
laws, the most a U.S. court system can do to cull the reluctance 
to publish facilitated by foreign lawsuits is grant U.S. parties 
the power to vindicate their domestic rights.109 
Yet, to fully vindicate one‘s domestic rights, invalidation of 
such a foreign libel judgment must be an option for a United States 
court.  Rachel Ehrenfeld experienced the chilling effects on her 
 
 106 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 107 Todd W. Moore, Untying Our Hands: The Case for Uniform Personal 
Jurisdiction over “Libel Tourists”, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3207, 3225 (2009). 
 108 Id. at 3247-48. 
 109 Id. at 3248-49. 
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work when United Kingdom publishers recalled her book.  
Although Mahfouz never tried to enforce his judgment here in the 
United States, his judgment placed enough fear on publishers 
abroad to make them cut into Ehrenfeld‘s free expression and 
―wallet.‖  As discussed in the onset of subsection III.B.2, supra, 
without the power to invalidate a repugnant foreign libel judgment, 
the court will not effectively support the First Amendment and will 
not limit those who attempt to stifle free speech. 
CONCLUSION 
―If the Freedom of Speech is taken away, then dumb and silent 
we may be led, like sheep to the slaughter.‖110  Our founding 
fathers knew that the freedom to express oneself, the freedom to 
promote debate, and stir emotion and thought in others, were the 
cornerstones of a flourishing democratic society.  Furthermore, the 
old adage that ―the pen is mightier than the sword‖ still holds 
weight in a society where corruption, hate, greed, and clear motives 
to destroy others pervade many of the world‘s rich and powerful 
figures.  In many cases, the only way to counter such grave forces is 
by revealing the truth to the public.  In no instance shall false 
representation about a person be tolerated, and libel suits are 
warranted when falsity can be shown.  However, libel tourism 
protects primarily those who have something to hide; those who 
would likely fail in a libel suit in the United States.  Congress is on 
the right path to protect United States citizens with the new Libel 
Tourism bill.  United States courts, however, need to have broad 
long-arm jurisdiction to review all libel judgments attained against 
individual United States citizens abroad.  Even if a foreign libel 
plaintiff never tries to enforce his judgment here in the States, the 
chilling effects on speech still remain.  Therefore, courts require 
this jurisdictional power to invalidate libel judgments that would 
have never been rendered in a United States court.  Courts need 
the applicable power in order to convey to the world that the United 
States strictly enforces First Amendment rights, and will not allow 
these rights to be abridged by international forum shopping. 
 
 
 110 Thinkexist.com, George Washington Quotes, http://thinkexist.com/ 
quotation/if_the_freedom_of_speech_is_taken_away_then_dumb/323858.html (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2010). 
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